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I. Introduction 
Without discretionary power, asymmetric information is not enough for political budget cycles 
(PBC). The degree of discretion of the executive has been overlooked in the empirical literature 
on PBC, perhaps because theoretical papers on opportunistic cycles usually model fiscal policy in 
terms of a single policy maker. However, in the U.S. two-party system Alesina and Rosenthal 
[1995] show how divided government is a tool to moderate the executive. A similar logic might 
apply in an opportunistic framework, where an opposition legislature may play a special role in 
moderating PBC. Indeed, Schuknecht [1996] suggests that stronger PBC in developing countries 
might be due to the existence of weaker checks and balances there.   
Hence, what we add to the ongoing debate about the factors behind PBC is a look at the 
role of effective checks and balances that reduce the discretion of the executive. To measure 
nominal or formal checks and balances, we use the Henisz [2000] political constraints index 
based on the idea of veto players. We then construct a measure of effective checks and balances, 
as the product of political constraints and the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) measures 
of rule of law. 
We focus on the behavior of the budget surplus, because it is the most sensitive indicator 
of aggregate PBC. We also look at the effect of checks and balances on the persistence of the 
budget surplus, taking into account the suggestion in Tsebelis [2002] that more veto players 
imply that it is harder to change the status quo. 
 Section II briefly reviews the empirical literature on PBC most closely connected to our 
study. Section III presents the theoretical framework behind this study. Section IV describes the 
dataset, which draws mainly on the Brender and Drazen [2004] cross-country panel of 
democracies, and the Henisz [2002] political constraints dataset.  Section V presents econometric   3 
evidence on electoral budget cycles, isolating the discretional PBC. Section VI has the 
conclusions and questions for further research. 
 
II. Empirical literature 
There is a rich empirical literature on electoral cycles in fiscal policy. Tufte [1978] provides early 
evidence on opportunistic fiscal cycles in the United States and other countries. Recently, there 
has been a wave of empirical work on aggregate PBC using panels of countries. We concentrate 
on the studies by Shi and Svensson [2002a, 2002b], Persson and Tabellini [2002], and Brender 
and Drazen [2004], which are the basis for this research. 
We describe these studies in detail below. Briefly stated, Shi and Svensson [2002a, 
2002b] find PBC are widespread, being particularly pronounced in developing countries, 
something they relate to greater corruption and less informed voters. Looking at the subset of 
democratic countries, Persson and Tabellini [2002] also find PBC are widespread, being stronger 
in presidential countries and in countries with proportional elections. Brender and Drazen [2004] 
analyze democratic countries too. Once they take into account that new democracies have 
particularly strong PBC, cycles are not significant in the remnant countries, whether developed or 
developing, and whatever their form of government, electoral rules, or level of democracy. 
 
A. Shi and Svensson 
Shi and Svensson [2002b] analyze, for a panel of 91 countries over the 1975-1995 period, the 
influence of a variable ele that takes value 1 in electoral years, and 0 elsewhere. They find that 
there is a pre-electoral cycle in the fiscal surplus that is much stronger in developing countries: 
the surplus falls 1.4 percentage points (p.p.) of GDP, against 0.6 p.p. in developed countries. The 
reason for this difference is not the revenue cycle, which falls 0.3 p.p. in both groups, but rather   4 
that spending rises much more strongly in developing countries. They are able to explain these 
differences across groups of countries in terms of larger rents for incumbents in developing 
countries, using as proxies either the Transparency International measure of degree of corruption, 
or an average of five ICRG institutional indicators (rule of law, corruption in government, quality 
of the bureaucracy, risk of expropriation of private investment, and risk of repudiation of 
contracts). 
Shi and Svensson [2002a] look at a panel of 123 countries over the 1975-1995 period. 
Besides the pre-electoral effects captured with ele, they look at the combined pre- and post-
electoral effects with a variable pbc that equals 1 in electoral years, -1 in post-electoral years, and 
0 otherwise. The variable pbc, which imposes the restriction that the contraction after elections is 
of the same magnitude as the expansion prior to elections, almost invariably turns out to be more 
significant in statistical terms than the ele variable. They again find that PBC are pervasive, and 
that cycles are stronger in developing countries: pbc has a coefficient of –1.0 in developing 
countries, and -0.4 in developed countries. They explain the differences in terms of a variable 
sum, a weighted average of two indicators. First, the variable rents, an average of the five ICRG 
indicators mentioned above. The rationale is that low rents (i.e., a higher value of rents) indicate 
smaller incentives to remain in power.  Second, the variable informed voters, the product of 
number of radios per capita and a dummy that measures the freedom of broadcasting. The 
rationale is that a greater proportion of informed voters can reduce the problems of asymmetric 
information that allow cycles to take place. They find that the composite variable sum explains 
the differences between developing and developed cycles in regard to ele (however, they 
overlook to report the results with pbc). 
   5 
B. Persson and Tabellini 
Persson and Tabellini [2002] restrict their panel to 60 democratic countries over the 1960-1998 
period. They distinguish between the pre-electoral component of electoral cycles in fiscal policy, 
ele, and the post-electoral component, ele(+1), which takes value 1 in post-electoral years, and 0 
elsewhere. 
Though they do not test whether the differences are statistically significant, there appears 
to be a clear asymmetry in government expenditure, which is significantly cut the year after 
elections, while there is no pattern in the year before elections. On the other hand, tax cuts before 
elections are followed by similar hikes after elections. This pattern is reflected in the electoral 
behavior of the budget surplus, which falls 0.1 p.p. of GDP before elections, and rises 0.4 p.p. 
afterwards. Controlling for the effect of the level of democracy, they find cycles not only in the 
whole range of democracies (polity index from the Polity IV dataset between 1 and 10), but also 
in the countries with the best democratic institutions (polity index of 9 or 10). 
Persson and Tabellini also analyze the effect of electoral rules and forms of government 
on PBC. As to electoral rules, they find a statistically significant difference in the case of 
spending before elections, which tends to fall in majoritarian countries, and to rise in proportional 
countries (though these effects are not statistically significant in themselves, the difference is). As 
to the form of government, the differences are more prominent. In presidential countries, the 
post-electoral effects of a fall in expenditure, and a rise of taxes and surplus, are stronger than in 
parliamentary countries, and the differences tend to be statistically significant. 
 
C. Brender and Drazen 
Brender and Drazen [2004] study a panel of 68 democratic countries over the 1960-2001 period. 
They concentrate on pre-electoral effects using the ele variable. They distinguish between new   6 
and old democracies. Countries are new democracies during the first four competitive elections, 
before becoming established democracies. The idea behind this is that voting may require a local 
learning process that matures with electoral experience, so the problems of asymmetric 
information may be alleviated over time. 
When all countries are pooled, the electoral effect on the budget surplus of the first four 
competitive elections is between -1 and -1.2 percentage points of GDP, while the rest of the 
elections have a negligible effect on the budget surplus. When they partition the data, Brender 
and Drazen find that PBC are statistically significant in new democracies. On the other hand, old 
democracies show no evidence of cycles using the ele variable, whether in OECD countries or 
not, and whatever the level of democracy (countries with a polity index between 0 and 9, or an 
index of 10), the form of government (presidential or parliamentary), or the electoral rules 
(majoritarian or proportional). 
 
III. Theoretical framework 
Two key references on rational electoral cycles are Rogoff [1990] and Lohmann [1998]. They 
have different implications on the likelihood of PBC, and on the effects of PBC on the probability 
of reelection. Rogoff [1990] models electoral cycles in fiscal policy building on earlier work by 
Rogoff and Sibert [1988]. Under asymmetric information, he shows that cycles can be interpreted 
as a signal of the competency of the incumbent. In equilibrium, only competent incumbents 
engage in PBC, and PBC increase the probability of reelection. Lohmann [1998a] models 
electoral cycles in monetary policy. She makes the nice point that even if one abstracts from the 
signaling problem, there will still be cycles under asymmetric information about the policy 
process. The underlying issue is a credibility problem, by which the executive cannot credible 
commit to not pursue expansionary policy before elections. This credibility problem carries over   7 
to fiscal policy. Shi and Svensson [2002a], in a setup that includes government debt, show that 
the incumbent will have an incentive to raise total expenditure and lower taxes, thereby 
increasing the budget deficit. In equilibrium, all types of incumbents engage in cycles, so cycles 
do not increase the probability of reelection. 
The standard results on rational PBC not only require asymmetric information, but also a 
fiscal authority with discretion over fiscal policy; once one drops the assumption of a single fiscal 
authority, the possibility of PBC will depend on the leeway that the legislature allows the 
executive in pursuing electoral destabilization [Streb, 2003]. This may be empirically relevant, 
since Alesina, Roubini, and Cohen [1997, chaps. 4 and 6] trace the lack of recent evidence on 
opportunistic cycles in the United States back to the fact that after 1980 many federal transfer 
programs have become mandatory by acts of Congress, so they cannot be easily manipulated for 
short run purposes. 
Persson, Roland and Tabellini [1997] sparked off fruitful research on the implications of 
separation of powers for fiscal policy, but they did not consider its specific implications for PBC. 
Saporiti and Streb [2004] formally analyze the implications for PBC of considering that in 
constitutional democracies the process of drafting, revising, approving and implementing the 
budget requires the concourse of the legislature.
1 In a framework of asymmetric information on 
the budgetary process similar to the Lohmann [1998a] timing, the moderating influence of the 
legislature is largest when the status quo is given by the previous period’s budget. In terms of the 
time-consistency literature on “rules versus discretion” stemming from Kydland and Prescott 
[1977], which discusses how to solve the credibility problems faced by policy-makers, separation 
of powers is needed to make the budget rule credible, i.e., to commit the executive to not doing 
stimulative policies in electoral periods.   8 
The interpretation we follow here is that separation of powers has a bite in the fiscal 
process when the executive and legislative branches are not perfectly aligned. This draws on the 
insight of Alesina and Rosenthal [1995] on the moderating influence of an opposition legislature. 
Through the metric of veto players [Tsebelis, 2002], this insight applies not only to divided 
government in presidential systems, but more generally to coalition governments (besides, 
coalition members start to compete for votes close to elections). Given this, the Saporiti and Streb 
[2004] model has sharp empirical implications. If there is perfect compliance with the budget 
law, the budget rule is credible when the party of the executive’s leader does not control the 
legislature.
2 If there is imperfect compliance, however, the rule is not credible and PBC subsist. 
Hence, PBC should be larger either in countries with low legislative checks and balances, or with 
low observance of the rule of law. 
 
IV. Data and Econometric Specification 
We basically use the Brender and Drazen [2004] dataset. Additionally, we resort to the Henisz 
[2002] POLCON dataset. The precise definitions and sources of the variables used in the 
regressions are given in Table AI in the Appendix. 
Brender and Drazen [2004] compile a panel data set that covers 68 developed and 
developing democracies, with annual observations for the period between 1960 and 2001. The 
sample is restricted to years in which the polity index from the Polity IV Project is non-negative, 
when the country is a democracy with competitive elections. They construct election dates with 
data from the Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, the International Foundation for 
Electoral Systems, the Database of Political Institutions (DPI) Version 3, and several other 
sources.   9 
Brender and Drazen depurate the IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS) fiscal series 
on government surplus, total expenditure, and total revenue and grants, and calculate them as 
percentage of GDP (drawn from the IFS). They draw on the World Bank World Development 
Indicators for control variables like per capita GDP, GDP growth rates and share of international 
trade. 
From the Henisz [2002] POLCON dataset, we use the political constraints index polcon3. 
This index takes into account the extent of alignment across the executive and legislative 
branches of government, and was designed by Henisz [2000] to measure the political constraints 
facing the executive when implementing a policy.
3 More alignment increases the feasibility of 
policy change and implies less political constraints for the executive. The minimum is a value of 
0, which implies no constraints and absolute political discretion for the executive. As the value of 
polcon3 increases, more political constraints are implied. With a single legislative chamber, 
polcon3 may reach a maximum of 2/3; while with two chambers the maximum is 4/5, when 
neither of the chambers is aligned with the executive.  
We define a variable p3 that rescales polcon3, dividing it by 2/3, and which equals 1 for 
values of polcon3 equal to 2/3 or more, because values of 2/3 or more imply that the executive 
faces at least one veto player. In consequence, p3 varies in the [0,1] interval. The POLCON 
dataset reports the ICRG index on Law and Order, which measures the degree of rule of law 
based on a scale from 0 (low) to 6 (high) characterizing the strength and impartiality of the legal 
system and the general observance of the law. In earlier years when the Law and Order index is 
not available, we use instead the ICRG Rule of Law index.
4 We divide these indices by 6, so lo 
varies in the [0,1] interval. Our measure of effective checks and balances is p3_lo=p3*lo, which 
combines p3 with lo to capture both the legislative checks and balances and the degree of 
compliance with the law.   10 
Following our theoretical framework and the previous empirical literature on electoral 
cycles in fiscal policy, a relation between a given fiscal variable y in country i and year t (yi,t) and 
the electoral cycle can be described as follows: 
 
where Ei,t is a dummy election variable, xi,t is a vector of  m controls, zi,t is a proxy variable for 
effective checks and balances conditioning the electoral policy manipulations, mi  is a specific 
country effect, and the term ei,t  is a random error that is assumed  i.i.d. This specification 
represents a dynamic panel model, where the dependent variable is a function of its own lagged 
levels, a set of controls and the electoral timing conditioned by effective checks and balances.  
Estimates are performed using two methods, Fixed Effects (FE) and Generalized Method 
of Moments (GMM) for dynamic models of panel data using the procedure developed by 
Arellano and Bond [1991]. 
 
V.  Empirical Evidence 
We now turn to the evidence on aggregate PBC using the budget surplus. We study the influence 
of effective checks and balances, and discretional executive power on PBC in developed and 
developing countries. We then control for the influence of voter experience, form of government 
and electoral rules on discretional PBC. Finally, to make sure the impact of executive discretion 
on electoral cycles is not driven by a larger degree of uninformed and inexperienced voters, we 
check the subset of developed countries that are established democracies. 
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A. OECD and non-OECD countries 
Our aim is to explore the Schuknecht [1996] conjecture that stronger PBC in developing 
countries might be related to weaker checks and balances there. We look at the influence of 
electoral cycles on the behavior of the budget surplus as a percentage of GDP, bal. 
We use the same control variables as Brender and Drazen [2004], except for the use the 
growth rate of real GDP to control for cyclical effects (the use of the output gap measured with 
the Hodrick-Prescott filter does not affect the results). We additionally control for the effect of 
inflation and its square, ln(1+pi) and ln(1+pi)sq, to account for issues like tax collection lags. We 
exclude Sweden from the sample, due to a jump in the fiscal series in the early 1990s, so our 
panel is reduced to 67 countries. 
The data is annual, though monthly data would be ideal. The estimates with annual data 
are downward biased, and may lead to underestimate the size of PBC: as Akhmedov and 
Zhuravskaya [2004] show for Russia, the effects of PBC are strongest in the months closest to 
elections, and shifts of opposite sign in fiscal policies around elections partly cancel out with low 
frequency (quarterly or annual) data. 
We concentrate on the electoral dummy pbc, which takes value 1 in electoral years, –1 in 
post-electoral years, and 0 otherwise. This variable is meant to capture both pre and post-electoral 
effects, following the approach in Shi and Svensson [2002a]. It is constructed with the ele 
variable in Brender and Drazen [2003], which only takes elections when the polity index is non-
negative, combined with its lead, ele(+1).
5 Persson and Tabellini [2002] remark that pre and post 
electoral effects may differ, so we first check in Table I if the restriction that the coefficient 
estimate of ele is equal to the coefficient estimate of minus ele(+1) is not rejected by the data. 
 
<please see Table I>   12 
Column (1) of Table I shows that the restriction that the pos-electoral contraction in the 
budget surplus as a percentage of GDP (bal) is of the same size as the pre-electoral expansion is 
not rejected by the annual data (columns (2) and (3), which separate OECD and non-OECD 
countries, are similar). We can interpret the effect of PBC as short-run displacements: the surplus 
falls below its trend, and then jumps above it, if expenditures are speeded up, and taxes 
postponed, around elections.
6 
Column (4) of Table I shows that the electoral cycle measured by the pbc dummy variable 
shows a fall of 0.3 p.p. of GDP in the surplus before elections, and an equivalent rise after 
elections. The pattern observed by Shi and Svensson [2002a,b] that electoral cycles are stronger 
in developing countries appears here, though the difference is not statistically significant.
7 
Columns (5) and (6) show that in OECD countries this effect is slightly smaller (0.24 p.p. of 
GDP), while in non-OECD countries it is slightly larger (0.36 p.p. of GDP). 
Table II tests if effective checks and balances p3_lo have a moderating influence on PBC, 
checking whether the coefficient estimate of the compound variable pbc_p3_lo=pbc*p3*lo shows 
the theoretically expected positive sign. 
 
<please see Table II> 
 
Column (1) of Table II shows that effective checks and balances moderate PBC, though 
they do not have a significant influence by themselves (Columns (2) and (3) report estimates that 
are restricted to OECD and non-OECD countries). 
However, we are interested in the net effect of checks and balances, given our conjecture 
that veto players will prevent PBC. Based on an F-test, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the 
coefficient of pbc is equal to minus the coefficient of pbc_p3_lo. In what follows we proceed to   13 
isolate what can be called the discretional component of PBC, adjusting the original pbc variable 
by effective checks and balances: pbcdis=pbc-pbc_p3_lo=pbc(1-p3*lo).
8 This adjustment 
implies, at one extreme, that if the legislature is perfectly aligned with the executive (p3=0), or if 
the observance of rule of law is very low (lo=0), the original pbc variable is unchanged. At the 
other extreme, if the legislature is not aligned with the executive and constitutes a veto player 
(p3=1), and there is a high value of rule of law (lo=1), an election year would not be counted as 
such, because the electoral cycle would be completely counteracted by the legislative checks and 
balances. 
Since the data on rule of law is only available since 1982, for comparison we defined a 
dummy variable lod that takes value 1 if lo is larger than 4 in all years that are reported for a 
given country, and 0 otherwise. This second treatment implies treating rule of law as a fixed 
characteristic, so each country has either low or high rule of law. This has the advantage of 
extending the available data, but the disadvantage of losing the variation over time of rule of law. 
In the alternative measure pbc_p3_lod, pbc is multiplied by p3 and lod. As column (4) shows for 
the complete sample over the whole period, this alternative measure of effective checks and 
balances, which affects PBC significantly, also allows to  isolate a discretional component. 
 Table III presents the estimates including our variable that captures the discretional 
component of cycles, pbcdis=pbc*(1-p3*lo).  
 
<please see Table III> 
 
The estimates of the effect of discretional PBC in column (1) of Table III are significant at 
the 1% level, as are those of PBC in column (4) Table I. However, the estimated impact is larger 
for a country with no effective checks and balances: 0.9 p.p. of GDP. Figure I depicts the time   14 
path of the average budget surplus implied by the electoral cycle pbc and the discretional 
component pbcdis around a year of elections t in the whole sample (on average, there are 
elections every four years).  
 
<please see Figure I> 
 
Table III does not give the slightest hint that discretional PBC are different in OECD and 
non-OECD countries (columns (2) and (3) show coefficients for sub-samples).
9 However, 
discretionality is larger in non-OECD countries, where checks and balances are lower (Table AII 
in Appendix). Multiplying the average degree of discretionality in each group by the estimate in 
column (1) of Table III implies stronger PBC in developing countries: –0.6 p.p. of GDP in non-
OECD countries, against -0.3 p.p. of GDP in OECD countries. This agrees with Shi and 
Svensson [2002a,2002b], though the channel is that conjectured by Schuknecht [1996]: larger 
checks and balances moderate cycles in developed countries.  
Column (4) of Table III shows that with pbcdisd=pbc*(1-p3_lod), the effect is 0.5 p.p. of 
GDP. Since this captures average rather than marginal effects, showing the influence of political 
constraints with switch from a low rule of law to a high rule of law country, in what follows we 
focus on pbcdis. 
 
B. New and Old Democracies 
Given the fact that voters in established democracies might behave as fiscal conservatives that 
punish deficit spending, Brender and Drazen [2004] designed a filter variable newd to take into 
account whether a country is a new democracy or not. We classify a country as newd if, 
according to Brender and Drazen [2004], any of the elections in the sample period belongs to the   15 
first four competitive elections. Besides the direct effect of checks and balances on the level of 
electoral cycles, in Table IV we consider their indirect effect on persistence, given the 
observation in Tsebelis [2002] that more veto players should lead to more persistence of policies. 
 
<please see Table IV> 
 
Column (1) of Table IV differs from column (1) of Table III in the lagged term bal(-
1)_dis=bal(-1)*(1-p3*lo), where the past surplus interacts with the current degree of 
discretionary power. More discretion (less effective checks and balances) decreases the 
persistence of budget surpluses, or deficits. This might be an indication of how checks and 
balances can limit cyclical effects, also making it harder for governments to reduce the surplus in 
election years. 
The degree of discretion is larger in new democracies (Appendix, Table AII), so the 
coefficient estimate in column (1) implies the result in Brender and Drazen (2003, 2004) that 
cycles are stronger in new democracies. In addition, the discretionary component of cycles pbcdis 
has a larger impact in new democracies, though the difference is not statistically significant.
10 
Columns (2) and (3) show separate estimates for new and old democracies. Though PBC are 
particularly strong in new democracies, isolating the discretional component leads to find 
significant PBC in established democracies. 
All the regressions so far use country fixed effects. The use of fixed effects estimators in a 
regression with lagged dependent variables, as in our case with bal(-1), introduces a potential 
bias. Since the order of the bias is 1/T, were T is the length of the panel, we expect a small bias.
11 
The Arellano-Bond procedure addresses this bias. Nevertheless, it makes use of the lagged values 
of the explanatory variables as instruments, and this reduces the set of observations. To make   16 
sure the estimates are robust to different econometric methodologies, results from the two 
methods are reported. 
The results from the GMM estimates confirm the results from FE estimates for the 
relevant variables. Columns (4) through (6) were carried out with the GMM estimator using the 
Arellano-Bond procedure. We used the one step heteroskedastic-consistent estimator of the 
variance-covariance matrix of the parameter estimates and the two-step estimator, presenting the 
best results according to the Sargan test and the second order correlation test. 
To track the possible sources of discretional PBC in the budget surplus, Tables V and VI 
show the results with total expenditure (texp) and total revenue and grants (trg) as dependant 
variables.  
 
<please see Tables V and VI> 
 
The discretional PBC cycle is related to a tendency of expenditure to go up, and revenues 
to go down, in election years (a pattern that is reversed after elections). These effects are not 
always statistically significant by themselves in the FE estimates. However, it is clear that their 
combined effect leads to a significant electoral cycle in the budget in Table IV. In this sense, the 
budget surplus is a more sensitive indicator of PBC than its components. The GMM estimates of 
Tables V and VI show more clearly that effective checks and balances have significant impacts 
on PBC. On the other hand, effective checks and balances generally do not affect the persistence 
of either expenditure or revenue. 
 
C. Form of Government and Electoral Rules   17 
Persson and Tabellini [2002] focus on the effects of different forms of government and electoral 
rules on PBC, but the approach followed here in principle attempts to reduce these institutional 
differences to a common metric of veto players [Tsebelis, 2002]. Table VII shows the influence 
of form of government (presidential or parliamentary) and electoral rules (proportional or 
majoritarian). 
 
<please see Table VII> 
 
Though the effect of discretional cycles are more significant in presidential and 
proportional countries, in line with the findings of Persson and Tabellini [2002], according to the 
F-tests the coefficients do not differ significantly from parliamentary and majoritarian countries 
(this result is not affected when one distinguishes between new and old democracies). Hence, 
once one accounts for veto players, we cannot reject the hypothesis that cycles do not differ with 
different systems of government and with different electoral rules. 
In relation to persistence, there is one significant difference. Presidential countries show 
less persistence than parliamentary countries in column (1). However, this can be ascribed to the 
fact that 29 of the 34 new democracies have presidential systems, compared to 8 of the 30 old 
democracies, and new democracies show less persistence (see Table VIII below). There seems to 
be no difference in persistence with different electoral rules in column (4). It must be kept in 
mind that most countries have proportional electoral rules: only 5 of the 34 new democracies, and 
5 of the 30 old democracies, are majoritarian. Proportional systems might have a moderating 
effect, leaving less room for PBC, because there might be more veto players, but in principle that 
should be reflected in polcon3. 
   18 
D. Democracies All, Rich and Established, Poor and Young  
Finally, we present a specification for all democracies amended to take into account that 
discretion reduces persistence in new democracies more that in old democracies (cf. footnote 9). 
We also present the estimates for the two most typical groups: OECD countries that are 
established democracies (19 out of 23 OECD countries fall into that category) and non-OECD 
countries that are new democracies (32 out of 44 non-OECD countries). 
 
<please see Table VIII> 
 
The FE estimate in column (1) of Table VIII shows there is a significant PBC in 
democracies. This is also true of the GMM estimates of column (4), but the null hypothesis of no 
second-order autocorrelation in the differenced residuals is rejected, and this could imply that the 
estimates are inconsistent. PBC are significant even if one restricts the sample to rich, established 
democracies, where Shi and Svensson [2002a] and Brender and Drazen [2004] show that voters 
are more informed and more experienced. 
 
VI. Final remarks 
Aggregate electoral cycles are more controversial than electoral cycles in the composition of 
government spending, due to the weak evidence on aggregate PBC in OECD countries. 
Following the insight in Alesina and Rosenthal [1995] that divided government moderates 
executive discretion, we use the Henisz political constraints index, combined with the degree of 
rule of law, to have a measure of the effective checks and balances that the executive faces, and 
to isolate the discretional component of PBC.   19 
We find that effective checks and balances play a significant role in moderating PBC, 
reducing the size of cycles. Discretional PBC are still present in the countries with the best-
informed and experienced voters, namely, developed countries that are established democracies. 
Econometrically, there is a errors-in-variables problem in the existing literature if the 
discretionary component of PBC is the relevant variable. We can also give an omitted variable 
interpretation to our results, where effective checks and balances is the missing variable. This 
omission is particularly serious in OECD countries and in old democracies, which are positively 
correlated with high checks and balances, biasing the estimate of PBC downwards. 
We have an imperfect measure of legislative checks and balances, and we do not control 
for differences in the budget process across countries. This might point to a promising path using 
more exact measures of veto players and budget institutions. 
Our results complement those of Alt and Lassen [2004], who find electoral cycles in fiscal 
balance in advanced industrialized democracies when there is low transparency, while no such 
cycles can be observed with high transparency. Together with asymmetric information and 
learning by voters (and policy players), the message here is that discretionality matters. 
Finally, we find that less discretion increases the persistence of the budget surplus, in 
accordance with Tsebelis [2002, p. 8]. This might not only make it harder to adjust to shocks [Alt 
and Lowry, 1994], but also to manipulate the budget to provoke, among other things, PBC. 
 
Appendix 
<please see Table A.I> 
<please see Table A.II> 
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1 In the case of monetary policy, Lohmann (1998b) and Drazen (2001) study how the delegation to an independent 
central bank can moderate electoral cycles. However, a single authority decides fiscal policy. 
2 This is related to the approach in Lohmann (1998b) on the conditions for independent monetary policy in Germany. 
3 Tsebelis [2002, chap. 8] questions the Henisz measure for parliamentary systems, because the veto players do not 
depend on opposition parties but rather on members of governing coalition. 
4 When there are overlapping observations, Rule of Law is an unbiased predictor of Law and Order, since the 
intercept is zero and the coefficient is 1. Therefore, we use the more recent series on Law and Order, supplementing 
it with Rule of Law when the former has missing observations. 
5 Brender and Drazen (2004) adjust the election years in several countries, based on the difference between fiscal and 
calendar year. We prefer to stick to the original election dates in Brender and Drazen (2003). 
6 As to the short-run postponement of taxes, Stein, Streb and Ghezzi (2004) find that in Latin America the exchange 
rate becomes 3% more appreciated than average in the run-up to presidential elections, and 3% more depreciated 
after. This is because the government first steps down on the monthly rate of depreciation, and then releases it. In an 
environment where inflation is a means of taxation, this manipulation of nominal exchange rate policy is a short-run 
PBC: on average, the changes are concentrated in the four months up to elections, and the four months that follow. 
7 Dividing pbc in column (4) of Table I into pbc_oecd=pbc*oecd and pbc_noecd=pbc*(1-oecd), the coefficients are 
–0.214 (t=-2.14) and –0.401(t=-3.60); with p-value 0.2118 an F-test cannot reject the equality of both coefficients. 
8 This also avoids multicollinearity, given the pairwise correlation of pbc and pbc_p3_lo of 0.90. 
9 Breaking down pbcdis in column (1) of Table III into pbcdis_oecd=pbcdis*oecd and pbcdis_noecd=pbcdis*(1-
oecd), the coefficients are –0.856 (t=-2.31) and –0.850 (t=-3.99; with p-value 0.9875 an F-test cannot reject the 
hypothesis that both coefficients are identical. 
10 Considering the effects of discretion on PBC and on persistence in column (1) of Table IV leads to following 
results. The coefficient of pbcdis_newd=pbcdis*newd is -0.876 (t=-3.50) and that of pbcdis_oldd=pbcdis*(1-newd) 
is -0.546  (t=-2.17), but the hypothesis that both coefficients are equal cannot be rejected with p-value 0.3529. There 
is a significant difference in persistence: the coefficient of bal(-1)_dis_newd=bal(-1)*dis*newd is -0.837 (t= -7.21) 
and that of bal(-1)_dis_oldd=bal(-1)*dis*(1-newd) is -0.249 (-2.03), with p-value 0.0000. 
11 In old democracies there are on average 17 observations per country, in new democracies 11, and in the total 13.   23 
















bal(-1)  0.613  0.781  0.483  0.613  0.781  0.482 
  (31.57)***  (35.26)***  (15.90)***  (31.57)***  (35.29)***  (15.91)*** 
lngdp_pc  0.463  0.672  0.021  0.475  0.675  0.033 
  (1.37)  (1.35)  (0.04)  (1.40)  (1.36)  (0.07) 
gdpr  0.091  0.153  0.057  0.091  0.153  0.056 
  (5.01)***  (6.28)***  (2.21)***  (4.99)***  (6.29)***  (2.18)** 
trade  0.003  -0.004  0.010  0.003  -0.004  0.010 
  (0.62)  (-0.55)  (1.43)  (0.61)  (--0.55)  (1.43) 
pop65  -0.031  -0.023  0.301  -0.034  -0.023  0.297 
  (-0.39)  (-0.30)  (1.36)  (-0.44)  (-0.31)  (1.34) 
pop1564  0.037  0.028  0.021  0.037  0.028  0.021 
  (0.98)  (0.61)  (-0.34)  (0.99)  (0.61)  (0.34) 
ln(1+pi)  1.504  -2.882  1.219  1.499  -2.886  1.209 
  (2.54)**  (-1.24)  (1.57)  (2.53)**  (-1.24)  (1.56) 
ln(1+pi)sq  -0.095  2.710  -0.133  -0.091  2.721  -0.128 
  (-0.55)  (0.68)  (-0.61)  (-0.53)  (0.68)  (-0.59) 
ele  -0.223  -0.225  -0.270       
  (-1.75)*  (-1.87)*  (-1.21)       
ele(+1)  0.371  0.246  0.439       
  (2.92)***  (2.03)**  (1.97)*       
pbc        -0.297  -0.236  -0.355 
        (-3.99)***  (-3.40)***  (-2.67)*** 
constant  -8.065  -8.238  -6.066  -8.105  -8.248  -6.102 
  (-2.12)*  (-1.42)  (-1.19)  (-2.13)**  (-1.42)  (-1.20) 













2 within  0.4822  0.7348  0.3232  0.4820  0.7348  0.3230 
R
2 between  0.8577  0.9821  0.2728  0.8577  0.9820  0.2764 
R
2 overall  0.6533  0.8466  0.3489  0.6534  0.8465  0.3504 
No. countries  67  23  44  67  23  44 
No. observations  1575  779  796  1575  779  796 
p-value F-test coef. 
ele = -ele(+1)  0.4733  0.9152  0.6379  -  -  - 
 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses; * significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level. To 
control for time effects, dummies are included for each five-year period from 1960-64 to 1995-99, while the years 2000-01 are the 
base level. These coefficients are not reported.   24 
















bal(-1)  0.469  0.777  0.199  0.615  0.783  0.472 
  (16.17)***  (23.97)***  (4.62)***  (30.74)***  (35.38)***  (14.43)*** 
lngdp_pc  0.400  0.375  -0.093  0.578  0.678  0.172 
  (0.55)  (0.41)  (-0.09)  (1.64)*  (1.36)  (0.34) 
gdpr  0.107  0.198  0.056  0.106  0.153  0.069 
  (4.27)***  (4.81)***  (1.80)*  (5.57)***  (6.31)***  (2.44)** 
trade  0.010  -0.002  0.029  0.001  -0.004  0.010 
  (1.08)  (-0.11)  (2.50)**  (0.24)  (-0.57)  (1.22) 
pop65  0.341  0.229  -0.190  -0.062  -0.026  0.188 
  (1.85)*  (1.42)  (-0.33)  (-0.76)  (-0.34)  (0.74) 
pop1564  0.013  -0.956  -0.071  0.036  0.028  0.027 
  (0.15)  (-0.81)  (-0.44)  (0.87)  (0.60)  (0.40) 
ln(1+pi)  1.555  -2.947  0.079  1.612  -2.818  1.322 
  (2.13)**  (-0.76)  (0.09)  (2.68)***  (-1.22)  (1.64) 
ln(1+pi)sq  -0.187  5.025  -0.010  -0.107  2.614  -0.155 
  (-0.93)  (0.88)  (-0.04)  (-0.62)  (0.66)  (-0.68) 
p3_lo  -0.975  -0.441  -0.698       
  (-1.42)  (-0.50)  (-0.75)       
p3_lod        -0.043  -0.116  0.970 
        (-0.05)  (-0.16)  (0.48) 
pbc  -0.793  -1.250  -0.317  -0.465  -0.703  -0.396 
  (-3.30)***  (-3.03)***  (-0.96)  (-3.91)***  (-3.15)***  (-2.54)** 
pbc_p3_lo  0.700  1.396  -0.631       
  (1.59)  (2.25)**  (-0.75)       
pbc_p3_lod        0.398  0.730  0.191 
        (1.82)*  (2.20)**  (0.34) 
constant  -10.236  -0.549  0.657  -8.622  -8.217  -7.179 
  (-1.30)  (-0.05)  (0.06)  (-2.06)**  (-1.42)  (-1.23) 
Method of 
estimation  Fixed-effects  Fixed-effects  Fixed-effects  Fixed-effects  Fixed-effects  Fixed-effects 
R
2 within  0.3547  0.7100  0.1933  0.4850  0.7366  0.3082 
R
2 between  0.2907  0.9770  0.2812  0.8601  0.9824  0.3275 
R
2 overall  0.3131  0.8504  0.2279  0.6589  0.8474  0.3743 
No. countries  64  23  41  64  23  41 
No. observations  860  387  473  1488  779  709 
p-value F-test coef.  
pbc = - pbc_p3_lo  0.7061  0.5519  0.1029  -  -  - 
p-value F-test coef.  
pbc = - pbc_p3_lod  -  -  -  0.6538  0.8461  0.6957 
 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses; * significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level. To 
control for time effects, dummies are included for each five-year period from 1960-64 to 1995-99, while the years 2000-01 are the 
base level. These coefficients are not reported.   25 
Table III. Discretional PBC in OECD and Non-OECD Countries 
 















bal(-1)  0.469  0.777  0.205  0.615  0.783  0.472 
  (16.19)***  (23.99)***  (4.75)***  (30.76)***  (35.41)***  (14.45)*** 
lngdp_pc  0.406  0.384  -0.016  0.578  0.678  0.173 
  (0.56)  (0.42)  (-0.02)  (1.64)*  (1.37)  (0.34) 
gdpr  0.107  0.199  0.056  0.106  0.154  0.069 
  (4.27)***  (4.84)***  (1.80)*  (5.57)***  (6.31)***  (2.44)** 
trade  0.010  -0.002  0.277  0.001  -0.004  0.010 
  (1.07)  (-0.12)  (2.37)**  (0.24)  (-0.57)  (1.22) 
pop65  0.341  0.228  -0.222  -0.062  -0.026  0.186 
  (1.85)*  (1.42)  (-0.39)  (-0.76)  (-0.34)  (0.74) 
pop1564  0.014  -0.097  -0.048  0.036  0.278  0.027 
  (0.16)  (-0.82)  (-0.30)  (0.87)  (0.60)  (0.41) 
ln(1+pi)  1.545  -2.999  0.083  1.607  -2.828  1.325 
  (2.12)**  (-0.77)  (0.09)  (2.67)***  (-1.22)  (1.64) 
ln(1+pi)sq  -0.184  5.161  -0.004  -0.105  2.629  -0.155 
  (-0.91)  (0.90)  (-0.02)  (-0.61)  (0.66)  (-0.68) 
p3_lo  -0.978  -0.456  -0.756       
  (-1.43)  (-0.51)  (-0.81)       
pbcdis  -0.851  -1.061  -0.697       
  (-4.61)***  (-4.02)***  (-3.00)***       
p3_lod        -0.032  -0.120  0.972 
        (-0.04)  (-0.17)  (0.48) 
pbcdisd        -0.483  -0.675  -0.405 
        (-4.30)***  (-4.06)***  (-2.61)*** 
constant  -10.345  -0.518  -0.940  -8.633  -8.218  -7.211 
  (-1.32)  (-0.05)  (-0.08)  (-2.06)**  (-1.42)  (-1.24) 













2 within  0.3546  0.7097  0.1882  0.4849  0.7366  0.3080 
R
2 between  0.2891  0.9771  0.3196  0.8600  0.9824  0.3310 
R
2 overall  0.3118  0.8503  0.2438  0.6590  0.8474  0.3757 
No. countries  64  23  41  64  23  41 
No. observations  860  387  473  1488  779  709 
 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses; * significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level. To 
control for time effects, dummies are included for each five-year period from 1960-64 to 1995-99, while the years 2000-01 are the 
base level. These coefficients are not reported.   26 






















bal(-1)  0.791  0.439  0.847  1.099  0.512  1.078 
  (11.87)***  (2.74)***  (12.60)***  (9.11)***  (2.82)***  (7.74)*** 
lngdp_pc  0.342  -1.755  0.651  -1.74  0.972  -1.148 
  (0.48)  (-1.02)  (0.90)  (-0.61)  (0.26)  (-0.43) 
gdpr  0.105  0.121  0.065  0.159  0.111  0.089 
  (4.25)***  (3.28)***  (2.07)**  (4.35)***  (1.49)  (1.57) 
trade  0.016  -0.013  0.031  0.027  -0.004  0.006 
  (1.75)*  (-0.75)  (3.02)***  (1.56)  (-0.13)  (0.39) 
pop65  0.258  0.580  0.399  2.988  3.910  0.456 
  (1.42)  (1.81)*  (1.82)*  (0.96)  (1.45)  (0.54) 
pop1564  0.058  -0.120  0.159  0.101  -1.197  0.482 
  (0.66)  (-0.60)  (1.53)**  (0.11)  (-1.55)  (1.34) 
ln(1+pi)  1.096  1.517  -1.405  3.996  0.414  1.256 
  (1.52)  (1.66)*  (-0.65)  (2.21)**  (0.26)  (0.41) 
ln(1+pi)sq  -0.141  -0.396  0.178  -0.862  -0.207  2.370 
  (-0.71)  (-1.62)  (0.11)  (-2.32)**  (-0.83)  (1.90)* 
p3_lo  0.326  -2.575  1.652  2.835  -2.081  2.864 
  (0.46)  (-2.17)**  (1.84)*  (1.94)*  (-1.65)  (2.31)** 
pbcdis  -0.787  -0.780  -0.505  -0.697  -0.967  -0.493 
  (-4.33)***  (-2.76)***  (-2.26)**  (-6.01)***  (-3.68)***  (-1.72)* 
bal(-1)_dis  -0.604  -0.424  -0.585  -1.041  -0.561  -0.628 
  (-5.34)***  (-1.78)*  (-4.49)***  (-5.30)****  (-2.50)**  (-2.79)*** 
constant  -12.783  15.192  -24.884  -0.176  0.045  -0.352 
  (-1.65)*  (1.11)  (-2.66)***  (-0.71)  (0.36)  (-0.74) 













2 within  0.3773  0.1665  0.5892  -  -  - 
R
2 between  0.3392  0.0832  0.2724  -  -  - 
R
2 overall  0.3557  0.0030  0.3251  -  -  - 
Sargan Test
b  -  -  -  1.000  1.000  0.9609 
2
nd Order Serial 
Correlation Test
c  -  -  -  0.1107  0.0830  0.4140 
No. countries  64  34  30  62  32  30 
No. observations  860  362  498  725  295  430 
Notes: for fixed effects estimates, t statistics in parentheses; * significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** 
significant at the 1% level. To control for time effects, dummies are included for each five-year period from 1980-84 to 1995-99, 
while the years 2000-01 are the base level. These coefficients are not reported. 
For GMM estimates, z statistics in parentheses; * significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 
1% level. The instruments used in GMM regressions are two lags of the dependent variable and one lag of covariates. Reported 
coefficients correspond to the lagged first difference of the dependant variable (second lag not reported) and the first difference of 
covariates (lagged differences not reported). All instruments are treated as strictly exogenous. (a) Using heteroskedastic-consistent 
estimator of the variance-covariance matrix of the parameter estimates. (b) P-values for rejecting the null hypothesis in test of the 
over identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as a c
2 under the null hypothesis of instruments uncorrelated with the 
residuals. In one-step estimations p-values come from the one step homoskedastic estimator. (c) P-values for rejecting the null 
hypothesis in test for second order serial correlation in the first-difference residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the 
null of no serial correlation.   27 
Table V. Discretional Political Expenditure Cycles in Old and New Democracies 
 



















texp(-1)  0.720  0.517  0.759  0.995  0.617  0.797 
  (9.61)***  (2.41)**  (18.49)***  (9.15)***  (2.49)**  (11.88)*** 
lngdp_pc  -1.737  1.517  -1.358  -0.474  -2.009  1.596 
  (-1.21)  (0.34)  (-1.75)*  (-0.21)  (-0.23)  (0.65) 
gdpr  -0.111  -0.121  -0.085  -0.118  -0.081  -0.153 
  (-2.26)**  (-1.24)  (-2.56)**  (-4.22)***  (-0.82)  (-2.99)*** 
trade  0.014  0.075  -0.024  0.041  0.114  -0.021 
  (0.74)  (1.74)*  (-2.26)**  (3.30)  (1.78)*  (-1.23) 
pop65  1.422  2.753  -0.228  5.615  6.748  -0.236 
  (3.89)***  (3.27)***  (-1.00)  (1.70)*  (0.60)  (-0.33) 
pop1564  0.181  -0.222  -0.138  -0.685  -1.341  -1.014 
  (1.02)  (-0.43)  (-1.24)  (-0.96)  (-0.60)  (2.39)** 
ln(1+pi)  -2.245  -2.093  3.021  -1.540  -3.159  -3.397 
  (-1.57)  (-0.85)  (1.32)  (-0.80)  (-1.67)*  (-0.96) 
ln(1+pi)sq  0.396  0.377  -1.517  0.401  0.686  -1.770 
  (1.00)  (0.58)  (-0.85)  (1.09)  (1.93)*  (-0.95) 
p3_lo  -1.088  -0.754  0.332  -18.201  -1.949  -0.906 
  (-0.37)  (-0.10)  (0.17)  (-3.40)***  (-0.28)  (-0.51) 
pbcdis  0.645  0.876  0.411  0.637  0.789  0.318 
  (1.79)*  (1.21)  (1.74)*  (2.51)**  (2.17)**  (1.04) 
texp(-1)_dis  -0.007  0.085  -0.018  -0.645  -0.134  -0.035 
  (-0.07)  (0.31)  (-0.31)  (4.14)***  (-0.37)  (-0.61) 
constant  -0.979  -10.022  32.788  0.096  0.146  0.013 
  (-0.06)  (-0.28)  (3.16)***  (0.57)  (0.46)  (0.28) 













2 within  0.3006  0.1720  0.7306  -  -  - 
R
2 between  0.8497  0.7441  0.8856  -  -  - 
R
2 overall  0.7621  0.5837  0.8630  -  -  - 
Sargan Test
b  -  -  -  1.000  0.9104  0.9399 
2nd Order Serial Correlation 
Test
c  -  -  -  0.9598  0.1208  0.3634 
No. countries  64  34  30  62  32  30 
No. observations  868  370  498  733  303  430 
Notes: for fixed effects estimates, t statistics in parentheses; * significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** 
significant at the 1% level. To control for time effects, dummies are included for each five-year period from 1980-84 to 1995-99, 
while the years 2000-01 are the base level. These coefficients are not reported. 
For GMM estimates, z statistics in parentheses; * significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 
1% level. The instruments used in GMM regressions are two lags of the dependent variable and one lag of covariates. Reported 
coefficients correspond to the lagged first difference of the dependant variable (second lag not reported) and the first difference of 
covariates (lagged differences not reported). All instruments are treated as strictly exogenous. (a) Using heteroskedastic-consistent 
estimator of the variance-covariance matrix of the parameter estimates. (b) P-values for rejecting the null hypothesis in test of the 
over identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as a c
2 under the null hypothesis of instruments uncorrelated with the 
residuals. In one-step estimations p-values come from the one step homoskedastic estimator. (c) P-values for rejecting the null 
hypothesis in test for second order serial correlation in the first-difference residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the 
null of no serial correlation.   28 
Table VI. Discretional Political Revenue Cycles in Old and New Democracies 
 



















trg(-1)  0.569  0.384  0.636  0.440  0.341  0.641 
  (6.71)***  (1.79)*  (14.42)***  (5.48)***  (2.18)**  (11.06)*** 
lngdp_pc  -2.091  -0.723  -1.325  -1.379  0.961  1.592 
  (-1.63)  (-0.17)  (-2.24)**  (-0.80)  (0.09)  (0.83) 
gdpr  0.003  0.031  -0.018  0.004  0.008  -0.074 
  (0.06)  (0.34)  (-0.72)  (0.20)  (0.08)  (-1.98)** 
trade  0.002  0.050  -0.019  0.017  0.098  -0.028 
  (0.12)  (1.20)  (-2.32)**  (1.97)**  (1.85)*  (-1.33) 
pop65  1.859  3.229  0.335  -0.120  8.110  0.323 
  (5.61)***  (4.09)***  (1.88)*  (-0.07)  (0.83)  (0.41) 
pop1564  0.157  -0.309  -0.156  -2.481  -3.124  -0.671 
  (0.98)  (-0.63)  (-1.85)*  (-3.22)***  (-1.56)  (-1.56) 
ln(1+pi)  0.044  0.673  1.448  -2.681  -1.32  -2.642 
  (0.03)  (0.30)  (0.81)  (-2.23)**  (-0.80)  (-0.90) 
ln(1+pi)sq  0.139  -0.037  0.724  0.770  0.304  1.457 
  (0.39)  (-0.06)  (0.53)  (2.26)**  (0.77)  (0.97) 
p3_lo  0.825  1.657  0.767  -0.895  -0.808  0.724 
  (0.29)  (0.24)  (0.48)  (-0.26)  (-0.20)  (0.74) 
pbcdis  -0.231  -0.107  -0.251  -0.682  -0.265  -0.295 
  (-0.71)  (-0.16)  (-1.38)  (-1.75)*  (-1.21)  (-1.71)* 
trg(-1)_dis  0.093  0.274  0.003  -0.053  0.045  -0.027 
  (0.93)  (1.00)  (0.07)  (-0.48)  (0.34)  (-0.67) 
constant  1.843  7.533  29.554  0.380  0.295  0.020 
  (0.13)  (0.23)  (3.83)***  (2.79)***  (1.07)  (0.36) 













2 within  0.2228  0.2016  0.5870  -  -  - 
R
2 between  0.7606  0.7047  0.9758  -  -  - 
R
2 overall  0.6867  0.5435  0.9527  -  -  - 
Sargan Test
b  -  -  -  1.0000  0.8670  0.9610 
2nd Order Serial Correlation 
Test
c  -  -  -  0.6452  0.2325  0.7713 
No. countries  64  34  30  62  32  30 
No. observations  860  362  498  725  295  430 
Notes: for fixed effects estimates, t statistics in parentheses; * significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** 
significant at the 1% level. To control for time effects, dummies are included for each five-year period from 1980-84 to 1995-99, 
while the years 2000-01 are the base level. These coefficients are not reported. 
For GMM estimates, z statistics in parentheses; * significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 
1% level. The instruments used in GMM regressions are two lags of the dependent variable and one lag of covariates. Reported 
coefficients correspond to the lagged first difference of the dependant variable (second lag not reported) and the first difference of 
covariates (lagged differences not reported). All instruments are treated as strictly exogenous. (a) Using heteroskedastic-consistent 
estimator of the variance-covariance matrix of the parameter estimates. (b) P-values for rejecting the null hypothesis in test of the 
over identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as a c
2 under the null hypothesis of instruments uncorrelated with the 
residuals. In one-step estimations p-values come from the one step homoskedastic estimator. (c) P-values for rejecting the null 
hypothesis in test for second order serial correlation in the first-difference residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the 
null of no serial correlation.   29 
Table VII. Form of Government,  Electoral Rules and Discretional PBC   
 
















bal(-1)  0.672  0.412  0.839  0.792  0.444  0.823 
  (9.51)***  (2.52)**  (11.58)***  (11.88)***  (2.78)***  (12.27)*** 
lngdp_pc  0.322  -1.878  0.637  0.360  -1.638  0.792 
  (-0.05)  (-1.09)  (0.87)  (0.50)  (-0.96)  (1.10) 
gdpr  0.109  0.124  0.066  0.105  0.117  0.059 
  (4.48)***  (3.34)***  (2.10)**  (4.25)***  (3.17)***  (1.90)* 
trade  0.004  -0.013  0.030  0.015  -0.015  0.043 
  (0.42)  (-0.76)  (2.79)***  (1.50)  (-0.87)  (3.95)*** 
pop65  0.352  0.631  0.400  0.263  0.588  0.309 
  (1.95)*  (1.94)*  (1.83)*  (1.44)  (1.83)*  (1.41) 
pop1564  0.057  -0.096  0.158  0.064  -0.105  0.087 
  (0.65)  (-0.47)  (1.51)  (0.71)  (-0.52)  (0.82) 
ln(1+pi)  0.742  1.454  -1.523  1.049  1.389  -1.300 
  (1.03)  (1.58)  (-0.71)  (1.45)  (1.52)  (-0.61) 
ln(1+pi)sq  -0.115  -0.385  0.223  -0.132  -0.373  0.574 
  (-0.59)  (-1.58)  (0.13)  (-0.67)  (-1.53)  (0.35) 
p3_lo  -0.170  -2.571  1.657  0.325  -2.683  1.057 
  (-0.24)  (-2.16)**  (1.84)*  (0.45)  (-2.26)**  (1.16) 
pbcdis_ pres  -0.882  -0.786  -0.638       
  (-4.10)***  (2.65)***  (-1.96)**       
pbcdis_ parl  -0.506  -0.996  -0.377       
  (-1.55)  (-1.05)  (-1.22)       
bal(-1)_dis_pres  -0.595  -0.407  -0.592       
  (-5.33)***  (-1.69)***  (-4.37)***       
bal(-1)_dis_ parl  -0.137  -0.001  -0.558       
  (-0.90)  (0.00)  (-3.55)***       
pbcdis_ prop        -0.884  -0.930  -0.559 
        (-4.47)***  (-3.06)***  (-2.30)** 
pbcdis_ maj        -0.233  -0.089  -0.461 
        (-0.50)  (-0.11)  (-0.85) 
bal(-1)_dis_ prop        -0.613  -0.445  -0.395 
        (-5.30)***  (-1.86)*  (-2.78)*** 
bal(-1)_dis_ maj        -0.579  0.027  -0.748 
        (-4.11)***  (0.05)  (-5.38)*** 
constant  -9.246  14.512  -24.445  -13.214  13.564  -21.173 
  (-1.20)  (1.05)  (-2.47)**  (-1.70)*  (0.99)  (-2.26)** 
Method of estimation  Fixed-effects  Fixed-effects  Fixed-effects  Fixed-effects  Fixed-effects  Fixed-effects 
R
2 within  0.3950  0.1695  0.5896  0.3787  0.1743  0.5981 
R
2 between  0.2489  0.0746  0.2709  0.3224  0.0690  0.3428 
R
2 overall  0.3045  0.0008  0.3249  0.3448  0.0041  0.3867 
No. countries  64  34  30  64  34  30 
No. observations  860  362  498  860  362  498 
p-value F-test pbcdis_pres  
 = pbcdis_parl  
0.3352  0.8328  0.5611  -  -  - 
p-value F-test bal(-1)_dis_pres 
= bal(-1)_dis_parl 
0.0000  0.3010  0.7835  -  -  - 
p-value F-test pbcdis_maj = 
pbcdis_prop  -  -  -  0.1998  0.3180  0.8699 
p-value F-test bal(-1)_dis_maj 
= bal(-1)_dis_prop  -  -  -  0.7518  0.3095  0.0017 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses; * significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level. To 
control for time effects, dummies are included for each five-year period from 1980-84 to 1995-99, while the years 2000-01 are the 
base level. These coefficients are not reported.   30 




























bal(-1)  0.724   0.716  0.347  1.105  0.774  0.263 
  (11.03)***  (10.75)***  (1.73)*  (7.85)***  (5.29)***  (1.07) 
lngdp_pc  0.002  -0.104  -1.948  -3.593  0.573  1.490 
  (0.00)  (-0.12)  (-1.00)  (-1.24)  (0.17)  (0.35) 
gdpr  0.101  0.231  0.114  0.184  0.235  0.097 
  (4.21)***  (5.12)***  (2.88)***  (4.61)***  (3.15)***  (1.27) 
trade  0.010  -0.002  -0.005  0.001  -0.020  0.002 
  (1.07)  (-0.16)  (-0.26)  (-0.09)  (-0.83)  (0.06) 
pop65  0.395  0.517  0.081  4.804  0.483  9.437 
  (2.21)**  (2.90)***  (0.12)  (2.18)**  (0.61)  (1.84) 
pop1564  0.045  0.021  -0.005  2.077  0.223  -1.264 
  (0.52)  (0.14)  (-0.02)  (2.47)**  (0.58)  (-1.31) 
ln(1+pi)  1.090  4.719  1.294  8.29  8.600  0.256 
  (1.55)  (1.17)  (1.25)  (2.93)***  0.99  (0.16) 
ln(1+pi)sq  -0.285  -9.611  -0.391  -1.772  -16.442  -0.214 
  (-1.47)  -1.33  (-1.46)  (-3.13)***  (-1.50)  (-0.87) 
p3_lo  -0.589  -0.954  -2.485  1.772  -0.373  -1.952 
  (-0.83)  (-0.93)  (-1.96)**  (1.14)  (-0.25)  -1.49 
pbcdis  -0.711  -0.817  -0.626  -0.437  -0.749  -0.755 
  (-4.01)***  (-2.89)***  (-2.01)**  (-2.09)**  (-3.32)***  (-2.91)*** 
bal(-1)_dis_newd  -0.843      -1.439     
  (-7.27)***      (-8.25)***     
bal(-1)_dis_oldd  -0.244      -0.919     
  (-1.99)**      (-3.77)     
bal(-1)_dis    0.218  -0.423    -0.382  0.327 
    (1.17)  (1.44)    (-1.03)  (1.03) 
Constant  -9.203  -7.138  12.398  0.433  0.022  0.037 




















2 within  0.4102  0.7844  0.1379  -  -  - 
R
2 between  0.2215  0.8790  0.0394  -  -  - 
R
2 overall  0.3063  0.8292  0.0011  -  -  - 
Sargan Test
b  -  -  -  1.000  1.000  1.000 
2nd Order Serial 
Correlation Test
c  -  -  -   
0.0170  0.2276  0.1134 
No. countries  64  19  30  62  19  28 
No. observations  860  319  294  725  279  235 
 
Notes: for fixed effects estimates, t statistics in parentheses; * significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** 
significant at the 1% level. To control for time effects, dummies are included for each five-year period from 1980-84 to 1995-99, 
while the years 2000-01 are the base level. These coefficients are not reported. 
For GMM estimates, z statistics in parentheses; * significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 
1% level. The instruments used in GMM regressions are two lags of the dependent variable and one lag of covariates. Reported 
coefficients correspond to the lagged first difference of the dependant variable (second lag not reported) and the first difference of 
covariates (lagged differences not reported). All instruments are treated as strictly exogenous. (a) Using heteroskedastic-consistent 
estimator of the variance-covariance matrix of the parameter estimates. (b) P-values for rejecting the null hypothesis in test of the 
over identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as a c
2 under the null hypothesis of instruments uncorrelated with the 
residuals. In one-step estimations p-values come from the one step homoskedastic estimator. (c) P-values for rejecting the null 
hypothesis in test for second order serial correlation in the first-difference residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the 
null of no serial correlation. 
   31 
Table AI. Definition of Variables 
Variable  Description  Source 
texp  Total government expenditure as a percentage of GDP  B&D(2004) 
trg  Total government revenue and grants as a percentage of GDP  B&D(2004) 
bal   trg-texp (Fiscal balance as a percentage of GDP)  B&D(2004) 
lngdp_pc   Natural log of GDP per capita  B&D(2004) 
gdpr   Annual growth rate of real GDP  B&D(2004) 
trade  Share of international trade as a percentage of GDP  B&D(2004) 
pop65  Fraction of population above 65  B&D(2004) 
pop1564  Fraction of population between 15 and 64  B&D(2004) 
ln(1+pi)  Natural log of 1 plus the inflation rate  IFS 
polcon3  Political constraints index  H(2002) 
p3  Takes value 1 if polcon3 ³ 2/3, and 3/2*polcon3 otherwise  O.C. 
lo  Law and Order index, combined with the ICRG Rule of Law index in 
the early years when the former is not available, divided by 6 
H(2002) and 
ICRG 
lod  Takes value 1 for country if lo³4 always, 0 otherwise  O.C. 
ele  Takes value 1 in election year, 0 otherwise  B&D(2003) 
pbc  ele minus its lead ele(+1), takes value 1 in election year, -1 in the 
following year, and 0 otherwise 
O.C. 
pbcdis  Discretional component of cycle, given by pbc* (1 - p3 * lo)  O.C.  
pbcdisd  Discretional component of cycle, given by pbc* (1 - p3 * lod)  O.C. 
pres  Takes value 1 if presidential system, 0 otherwise  B&D(2004) 
parl  Takes value 1 if parliamentary system, 0 otherwise  B&D(2004) 
prop  Takes value 1 if electoral rule is proportional, 0 otherwise  B&D(2004) 
maj  Takes value 1 if electoral rule is majoritarian, 0 otherwise  B&D(2004) 
oecd  Takes value 1 if country belongs to OECD, 0 otherwise  B&D(2004) 
newd  Takes value 1 if country is new democracy, 0 otherwise  B&D(2004) 
Notes: B&D(2003) refers to Brender and Drazen (2003), and similarly for B&D(2004); H(2002), to Henisz (2002); IFS, to the 
IMF International Financial Statistics; O.C., to variables that are our own construction.    32 
Table AII. Descriptive Statistics 
 
  OECD countries  Non-OECD countries  Total 
  I  bal  texp  trg  p3_lo  I  bal  texp  trg  p3_lo  I  bal  texp  trg  p3_lo 
Old 
democracies 











































































Note: I refers to number of countries in each group; standard deviation reported  in parenthesis below mean values.   33 
 











t-1 t t+1 t+2
Discretional PBC
PBC